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IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT’S  
DECISION  IN  PLIVA,  INC.  V.  MENSING:  WHY  
GENERIC  AND  BRAND-­‐‑NAME  PHARMACEUTICALS  
MUST  BE  TREATED  EQUALLY  UNDER  THE  FEDERAL  
FOOD,  DRUG,  AND  COSMETIC  ACT  
Courtney  A.  Markey*  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Traditionally,  medical  patients  overwhelmingly  have  had  to  rely  
on  their  doctors  to  give  them  all  the  information  they  needed  to  
make   certain   decisions   about   their   health.      Unless   one   was   a  
doctor,   medical   student,   or   pharmacist   it   usually   was   much  
more   difficult   to   obtain   information   about   prescription   drugs  
and   certain   over-­‐‑the-­‐‑counter  medications   in   the   past   than   it   is  
today.    However,  we  have  progressed  as  a  society  from  times  of  
doctors  making  house  calls  to  an  era  in  which  mass  marketing  of  
medical   products   and   communication   about   medical  
information  spans  the  globe.    Nowadays,  we  have  the  luxury  of  
the   internet   to   disseminate   and   obtain   medical   information,  
including  the  risks  certain  prescription  drugs  may  pose  to  their  
users.  
Nevertheless,  patients  should  not  be  forced  to  figure  out  on  
their   own   the   potential   problems  with   prescription   drugs   they  
take.    Although  newspapers,  magazines,  television,  Google,  and  
WebMD   supplement   information   patients   may   receive   from  
their   doctors,   patients   should   not   have   to   rely   on   these   other  
sources   for   warning   information   about   pharmaceutical  
prescription   drugs.      Companies   that   manufacture   prescription  
drugs   should  have  a  duty   to   inform  patients  about   the   risks  of  
ingesting  those  substances.  
Notification  to  consumers  of  risks  presented  by  prescription  
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drugs   is   instrumental   in   ensuring   the   utmost   safety   of  
consumers  who   take   them.     Wyeth   v.   Levine1   and  PLIVA,   Inc.   v.  
Mensing2   are   two   relatively   recent   landmark   Supreme   Court  
cases   involving   pharmaceutical   companies’   alleged   failure   to  
provide   adequate   warnings   on   prescription   drugs.      Although  
their  fact  patterns  are  extremely  similar,  the  cases  produced  very  
different   results.      In  Wyeth,   the  Court   found   that  a  brand-­‐‑name  
prescription   drug   manufacturer,   Wyeth,   was   able   to   comply  
with   state   and   federal   laws   simultaneously   and   that,   therefore,  
the   federal   Food,   Drug,   and   Cosmetic   Act   (FDCA)   did   not  
statutorily   preempt   the   plaintiff’s   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn  
claims.3      In   Mensing,   however,   the   Court   held   that   a   generic  
prescription  drug  manufacturer,  PLIVA,  was  not  able  to  comply  
with   both   state   and   federal   regulations,   and   that   the   FDCA  
statutorily   preempted   the   plaintiffs’   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn  
claims.4  
These   contrasting   results   have   now   created   obstacles   for  
ordinary  Americans  involved  in  prescription  drug  litigation.    To  
help   explain   how   they   have   done   so,   this   paper   discusses   and  
analyzes  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Wyeth  and  the  Court’s  
analysis  in  Mensing  of  the  FDCA.    This  paper  not  only  concludes  
that  the  Court’s  analysis  of  the  FDCA  in  Mensing  is  incorrect,  but  
also   alternatively   finds   that   the   Court’s   interpretation   of   the  
FDCA   in   Mensing   results   in   the   FDCA   violating   the   Equal  
Protection   component   of   the   5th   Amendment’s   Due   Process  
clause   because   of   the   FDCA’s   irrational   different   treatment   of  
generic   and   brand-­‐‑name   prescription   drugs.      Particularly,   this  
paper   explains   how   the   Court’s   interpretation   of   the   FDCA   in  
these   two  cases   creates  problems   for  many  Americans  who  are  
 
*   Courtney   A.   Markey   earned   her   Juris   Doctor   degree   from   the   University   of  
Baltimore   School   of   Law   and   graduated   in   May   of   2013.     She   completed   her  
undergraduate  degree  from  Wake  Forest  University  and  is  a  member  of  the  class  of  
2005.    She  currently  works  as  a  law  clerk  for  a  judge  in  Maryland.  
   1.     Wyeth  v.  Levine,  555  U.S.  555  (2009).  
   2.     PLIVA,  Inc.  v.  Mensing,  131  S.Ct.  2567  (2011).    
   3.     Wyeth,  555  U.S.  at  555.  
   4.     Mensing,  131  S.Ct.  at  2581.  
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harmed   by   prescription   drugs   that   fail   to   adequately   warn.    
Persons  who  are  most  affected  by  the  Mensing  decision  may  not  
have   access   to   mass   communication   such   as   the   internet   and  
television.    Many  poor  individuals  do  not  have  these  luxuries,  so  
there  may  be  no  way  that  they  would  have  access  to  the  kind  of  
medical  information  that  some  of  us  take  for  granted.    Even  if  a  
doctor   prescribes   a   prescription   drug   to   a   patient,   there   is   no  
guarantee   that   the   patient  will   be   able   to   find   out   the   relevant  
information   about   the   drug   on   his   or   her   own   via   today’s  
communication.  
Because   generic   and   brand-­‐‑name   prescription   drugs   are  
substantively   equivalent,   this   paper   ultimately   concludes   that  
the   Equal   Protection   component   of   the   Fifth   Amendment   Due  
Process   clause   requires   that   generic   and   brand-­‐‑name  
pharmaceuticals      be   treated   the   same   way   under   the   FDCA.    
Further,   it   recommends   the   introduction   of   congressional  
legislation  to  remedy  the  implications  of  the  Mensing  decision.  
Section   II  provides   a  brief   overview  of   the   similarities   and  
differences  between  generic  and  brand-­‐‑name  prescription  drugs.    
Section   III   then   discusses   the   legal   implications   of   such  
similarities  and  differences  in  the  context  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  
Wyeth  v.  Levine  and  PLIVA,  Inc.  v.  Mensing  decisions.    Section  IV  
discusses   the   Court’s   reasoning   in   Mensing   along   with   the  
specific  problems  its  holding  presents.     Subpart  A  of  Section  IV  
explores  issues  with  off-­‐‑market  brand-­‐‑name  prescription  drugs,  
while   Subpart   B   of   Section   IV   discusses   the   practice   of  
prescribing   brand-­‐‑name   pharmaceuticals   but   dispensing  
generics.      Subpart   C   of   Section   IV   discusses   the   particular  
problem  of  denial  of  equal  protection  by  the  FDCA  as  a  result  of  
the  Mensing  decision’s  federal  statutory  preemption  of  failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑
warn   claims   regarding   generic   drugs.      Section  V   then   explains  
how   the   interpretation   of   the   FDCA   by   the  Mensing   decision  
disproportionately  affects  women,  minorities,  and  the  elderly  in  
Subheadings  A,  B,  and  C,   respectively.     These  disproportionate  
effects   result   in   the   FDCA   violating   the   Equal   Protection  
component  of  the  Due  Process  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  of  
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the   U.S.   Constitution.      Section   VI   identifies   certain   state  
appellate   courts   which   are   more   and   less   favorable   to   such  
demographic   groups   in   cases   involving   tort   claims   against  
prescription   drug   manufacturers.      Section   VII   explores  
alternative   causes   of   action   besides   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn  
claims  that  can  be  used  by  consumers   injured  by  a  prescription  
drug.   Finally,   Section   VIII   examines   how   new   legislation  
amending   the   FDCA   can   overcome   the   equal   protection  
violation  in  the  FDCA  created  by  the  Mensing  decision.  
II.   OVERVIEW  OF  BRAND  NAME  AND  GENERIC  
PHARMACEUTICALS  
The   issue   of   cost   is   probably   the   most   obvious   difference  
that   comes   to   mind   when   examining   brand-­‐‑name   and   generic  
prescription  drugs.    Almost  everyone  knows  that  brand-­‐‑name  or  
“designer”   drugs   are   almost   always   more   expensive   than  
generics,   but   they  may   not   know  much  more   about   these   two  
types   of   drugs   beyond   this   fact.      Most   people   in   the   United  
States  probably  have,  at  one   time  or  another,  been  prescribed  a  
drug   from   a   physician   and   filled   the   prescription   at   a   local  
pharmacy.      Sometimes   a  person  may   check   to   see   if   they  were  
dispensed  the  brand-­‐‑name  or  the  generic  equivalent,  but  most  of  
the  time  they  likely  trust  that  the  drug  dispensed  to  them  will  do  
its   intended   job   regardless   of   whether   it’s   a   designer   brand-­‐‑
name  drug  or  a  generic.  
The   Drug   Price   Competition   and   Patent   Term   Restoration  
Act  of  19845,  more  commonly  referred  to  as  the  Hatch-­‐‑Waxman  
Act   of   1984,   revolutionized   the   way   we   as   a   society   consume  
prescription   drugs.      After   pharmaceutical   manufacturers   that  
initially   create   new   prescription   drugs   have   their   patents   on  
those   drugs   expire,   the   Hatch-­‐‑Waxman   Act   allows  
pharmaceutical   manufacturers   other   than   the   original   parent  
 
   5.     Gerald   J.   Mossinghoff,   Striking   the   Right   Balance   Between   Innovation   and  
Drug  Price  Competition  –  Understanding  the  Hatch-­‐‑Waxman  Act,  54  FOOD  &  DRUG  L.J.  
187,  188  (1999).  
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company  –  generic  manufacturers—to  produce  the  same  drug  at  
a  much  lower  cost.6  
The  Hatch-­‐‑Waxman  Act  has  enabled  more  Americans  to  get  
the  pharmaceuticals   they  need  at  affordable  prices.      In   fact,   the  
average   cost   of   a   generic   drug   is   about   80   to   85   percent   lower  
than  the  same  drug  in  its  brand-­‐‑name  form.7     Before  the  Hatch-­‐‑
Waxman   Act,   only   about   19   percent   of   pharmaceutical   drugs  
sold   in   the   U.S.   were   generic.8      Today,   about   75   percent   of   all  
prescriptions   in   the   U.S.   are   filled   with   generic   drugs;   this  
number   increases   to   90   percent   when   the   generic   drug   is  
available.9     The  Hatch-­‐‑Waxman  Act  has  also  resulted   in  a  boon  
for   the   generic   pharmaceutical   industry   because   generic  
manufacturers  have  been  able  to  piggyback  on  the  labors  of  the  
brand-­‐‑name  manufacturers  and  reap  similar  financial  rewards.  
Both   brand-­‐‑name   and   generic   prescription   drugs   must   be  
approved  by  the  Food  &  Drug  Administration  (FDA)  under  the  
FDCA.10    In  order  for  a  generic  prescription  drug  to  be  approved  
by   the  FDA,   it  has   to  be  exactly   the  same  effect-­‐‑wise  under   the  
FDA’s  regulations.11     The  FDA  can  approve  a  generic  drug  that  
is  “bioequivalent”  to  the  brand-­‐‑name  drug;  this  means  that  there  
is  an  “absence  of  a  significant  difference  in  the  availability  of  the  
active  ingredient  at  the  site  of  drug  action.”12  
Generic   and   brand-­‐‑name   prescription   drugs   share   many  
 
   6.     Linda  Park,  The  Generic  Pharmaceutical  Industry,  REG.  SCI.  J.,  
http://regulatory.usc.edu/Articles/GenericPharmaceuticalIndustry.pdf   (last   visited  
Sep.  30,  2013).    
   7.     The   U.S.   Food   and   Drug   Admin.,   Facts   About   Generic   Drugs,   DRUGS            
(Sept.  19,  2012),    
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafely
/understandinggenericdrugs/ucm167991.htm.    
   8.       CONG.   BUDGET   OFFICE,   HOW   INCREASED   COMPETITION   FROM   GENERIC  
DRUGS  HAS  AFFECTED  PRICES  AND  RETURNS  IN  THE  PHARMACEUTICAL  INDUSTRY,  27  
(1998),  
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf.  
   9.     Erwin  Chemerinksy,  A  Devastating  Decision,  TRIAL,  Sept.  2011,  at  54.    
   10.     21  U.S.C.  §  355  (2006).  
   11.     Aaron   S.   Kesselheim   et   al,  Clinical   Equivalence   of   Generic   and   Brand-­‐‑Name  
Drugs  Used  in  Cardiovascular  Disease,  JAMA,  2008,      
http://jama.ama-­‐‑assn.org/content/300/21/2514.full.  
   12.     Id.  at  2514.    
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similarities   in   their   substantive   composition.      Besides   the   fact  
that  the  active  ingredients  in  these  drugs  must  function  the  same  
way   in   each  person’s  body   to  get  FDA  approval,   there   are   still  
some  differences  between  the  two  types  of  drugs  that  are  worth  
noting.      According   to   the   Journal   of   American   Medicine,  
“[g]eneric  drugs  are   chemically   equivalent   to   their  brand-­‐‑name  
counterparts   in   terms   of   active   ingredients   but   may   differ   in  
peripheral  features,  such  as  pill  color  or  shape,  inert  binders  and  
fillers,   and   the   specific   manufacturing   process.”13      Other  
differences   may   include   other   superficial   traits   like   taste   and  
packaging.14      Often   times,   there   are   also   different   inactive  
ingredients   in   generics   that   may   alter   the   way   that   a   person’s  
bloodstream  absorbs  them.15  
According   to   the  FDA’s  guidelines,   “Generics   can  produce  
blood   levels   as  much   as   20   percent   below   or   25   percent   above  
that   of   the   original   drug   and   still   be   considered  
‘bioequivalent.’”16      Because   such   variances   exist,   generic  
manufacturers  must  prove  to  the  FDA  
that   their  product   is  manufactured   in  accordance  with  
good  manufacturing   practices   (GMPs),   and   is   as   pure  
and   stable   as   the   brand-­‐‑name   product.      Additionally,  
the  generic  needs   to  meet  pharmacokinetic  parameters  
in  the  body,  which  means  it  must  dissolve  (in  a  beaker)  
at  the  same  rate  and  to  the  same  extent  as  the  original.    
This   process   ensures   that   the   two   products   are  
bioequivalent   because   if   product   A   and   product   B  
dissolve   in   a   virtually   identical   manner,   then   they  
should  behave  the  same  in  the  body.17  
While   the   FDA  makes   sure   that   generics   reach   the  market  
without   any   significant   divergences   from   their   brand-­‐‑name  
 
   13.     Id.    
   14.     Erik  Mogalian  &  Paul  Myrdal,  What’s  the  Difference  Between  Brand-­‐‑Name  and  
Generic  Prescription  Drugs?,  SCI.  AM.,  Dec.  13,  2004,  
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=whats-­‐‑the-­‐‑difference-­‐‑betw-­‐‑2004-­‐‑
12-­‐‑13.  
   15.     Melinda  Beck,   Inexact  Copies:  How  Generics  Differ   from  Brand  Names,  WALL  
ST.  J.,  Apr.  22,  2008,  at  D1.  
   16.     Id.    
   17.     Mogalian,  supra  note  14.  
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counterparts,   there   still   remains   a   major   important   difference  
between  generics  and  brand-­‐‑names.    Most  people  may  not  know  
about   it,   but   it   affects   us   all:   the   Supreme   Court’s   decision   in  
PLIVA,   Inc.   v.  Mensing.      This   decision   precludes   the   filing   of   a  
lawsuit  against  a  generic  drug  manufacturer  under  a  failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑
adequately-­‐‑warn  claim.  
III.  WYETH  V.  LEVINE  AND  PLIVA,  INC.  V.  MENSING  
In   2009,   the   Supreme   Court   decided  Wyeth   v.   Levine.18      In  
Wyeth,   the   plaintiff,   Levine,   was   injected   with   Phenergan,   a  
brand-­‐‑name   anti-­‐‑nausea   drug,   through   the   IV-­‐‑push   method,  
directly   into  her   vein.19      Phenergan  was   found   to  have   entered  
Levine’s  artery,  which  led  to  her  developing  gangrene,  and  as  a  
result,   she  unfortunately  had   to  have  her   forearm  amputated.20    
Levine  thereafter  sued  Wyeth,   the  brand-­‐‑name  manufacturer  of  
Phenergan,  for  failing  to  adequately  warn  about  the  serious  risks  
involved  with  injecting  Phenergan  via  the  IV-­‐‑push  method.21    In  
this   decision,   the   Court   held   that   a   person’s   claim   against   the  
manufacturer  of  a  brand-­‐‑name  prescription  drug—alleging  that  
the  manufacturer  failed  to  adequately  warn  both  the  patient  and  
her   doctor   of   a   brand-­‐‑name   prescription   drug’s   harmful  
effects—is  not  preempted  by  federal  law,  and  that  a  brand-­‐‑name  
prescription  drug  manufacturer  could  be  held  liable  for  damages  
under  such  a  claim.22  
A   central   premise   of   federal   drug   regulation   is   that   a  
pharmaceutical  manufacturer  is  always  fully  responsible  for  the  
contents  of   its   label,   so   the  manufacturer   is   thus   the  party  who  
must  ensure  that   its   labels  and  warnings  are  adequate  while   its  
corresponding   drug   continues   to   be   sold.23      In   addition,   a  
manufacturer  of   a  brand-­‐‑name  prescription  drug   is   required   to  
 
   18.     Wyeth  v.  Levine,  555  U.S.  555,  570  (2009).  
   19.     Id.  at  555.  
   20.     Id.  
   21.     Id.  
   22.     Id.  at  581.  
   23.     Id.  at  570-­‐‑71.  
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revise   its   label   “to   include   a   warning   as   soon   as   there   is  
reasonable  evidence  of  an  association  of  a  serious  hazard  with  a  
drug.”24    According  to  Justice  Stevens,  who  authored  the  Court’s  
majority   opinion   in   Wyeth,   allowing   liability   of   such  
manufacturers   aligns   with   and   furthers   the   goal   of  
manufacturers’   disclosure   of   harmful   effects   of   their   drugs   to  
consumers  and  doctors,  thereby  better  protecting  them.25  
In   general,   a   pharmaceutical   manufacturer   must   obtain  
FDA  approval  of  any  changes  in  a  particular  prescription  drug’s  
label.26      However,   via   the   “changes   being   effected”   (CBE)  
regulation,   the   FDA   also   lets   a  manufacturer   of   a   brand-­‐‑name  
prescription   drug   change   its   label   even   before   the   new   label  
becomes  approved.27    The  way  the  CBE  regulation  works  is  that  
if   a   manufacturer   is   changing   a   label   to   ‘add   or  
strengthen   a   contraindication,  warning,   precaution,   or  
adverse  reaction’  or  to  ‘add  or  strengthen  an  instruction  
about   dosage   and   administration   that   is   intended   to  
increase  the  safe  use  of  the  drug  product,’  it  may  make  
the   labeling   change   upon   filing   its   supplemental  
application   with   the   FDA;   it   need   not   wait   for   FDA  
approval.28  
Wyeth   argued   that   it   could   not   have   changed   its   label  
unilaterally   because   the   FDCA   prohibits   misbranding.29    
However,   as   Justice  Stevens  noted   in  his  opinion,  Wyeth  could  
have  changed  its  warning  label  legally  because  the  FDCA  “does  
not   provide   that   a   drug   is   misbranded   simply   because   the  
manufacturer   has   altered   an   FDA-­‐‑approved   label.”30      The  
FDCA’s   misbranding   provision   instead   “focuses   on   the  
substance  of  the  label  and,  among  other  things,  proscribes  labels  
that   fail   to   include   ‘adequate  warnings.’”31      In  other  words,   the  
 
   24.     Id.  at  571  (quoting  21  C.F.R.  §  201.80(e)  (2013)).  
   25.     Erwin  Chemerinsky,  Closing   the   Courthouse  Doors,   14  GREEN  BAG   2D   375,  
380  (Oct.  2010).    
   26.     Wyeth,  555  U.S.  at  568.  
   27.     Id.  (quoting  21  C.F.R.  §  314.70(c)(6)  (2013)).  
   28.     Id.  (quoting  21  C.F.R.  §  314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A),  (C)  (2013)).  
   29.     Id  at  570.  
   30.     Id.  
   31.     Id.;    See  also  21  U.S.C.  §  352(f)  (2006).  
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FDCA   seeks   to   ensure   that   a   label   accurately   informs   people  
about   the   drug   even   if   it  means   erring   on   the   side   of   caution.    
According   to   the   Court   in   Wyeth,   because   Wyeth,   a  
manufacturer   of   brand-­‐‑name   prescription   drugs,   could   have  
used   the  CBE   regulation  mechanism  while   complying  with   the  
FDCA,   it   therefore   could   have   complied   with   both   state   and  
federal  law.32  
Furthermore,   the  Court  correctly  concluded   that  Wyeth,  as  
the  responsible  party,  should  have  changed  its  warning  and  had  
the  ability  to  do  so.    Because  there  was  no  clear  evidence  that  the  
FDA  would  have  rejected  approval  of  the  warning  label  change  
in  Wyeth,  the  Court  reasoned  that  it  was  not  “impossible  for  [the  
manufacturer]   to   comply   with   both   federal   and   state  
requirements,”33   and   properly   held   that   the   plaintiff’s   state  
common   law   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn   claim   was   not  
preempted  by  federal  law.34  
The  Court  also  used  Congress’s  intent  to  support  its  holding  
in   the  Wyeth   case.     According   to   Justice  Stevens,   “[I]f  Congress  
thought   state-­‐‑law   suits   posed   an   obstacle   to   its   objectives,   it  
surely  would  have  enacted  an  express  preemption  provision  at  
some   point   during   the   FDCA’s   70-­‐‑year   history.”35      He   further  
noted   that   Congress   enacted   an   express   preemption   provision  
for  failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn  claims  involving  medical  devices  
in  1976,  but  that  it  has  not  done  the  same  for  prescription  drugs,  
emphasizing   that:   “Congress   could   have   applied   the   pre-­‐‑
emption  clause  to  the  entire  FDCA.    It  did  not  do  so,  but  instead  
wrote   a   pre-­‐‑emption   clause   that   applies   only   to   medical  
devices.”36      Justice  Stevens   concluded   that  Congress’   silence  on  
this  issue,  along  with  its  awareness  of  the  frequency  of  state  tort  
litigation,   “is   powerful   evidence   that   Congress   did   not   intend  
FDA  oversight  to  be  the  exclusive  means  of  ensuring  drug  safety  
 
   32.     Wyeth,  555  U.S.  at  581.  
   33.     Id.  at  571.  
   34.     Id.  at  581.  
   35.     Id.  at  574.  
   36.     Id.   at   574-­‐‑5   (2009)   (quoting   Riegel   v.   Medtronic,   Inc.,   552   U.S.   312,   327  
(2008)).  
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and  effectiveness”  and  that   the  manufacturer  must   look  out   for  
the  safety  of   its  own  products.37     Given   that  Congress’   intent   is  
paramount   when   interpreting   legislation,   the   Court   correctly  
used   this   inference   to   conclude   that   the   plaintiff’s   state   law  
claims  were  not  preempted  by  federal  law.38  
Since  the  Wyeth  decision,  consumers  could  have  confidence  
that   a   remedy   in   law   existed   for   any   undisclosed   harms   that  
befell   them   from   their   brand-­‐‑name   prescription   drugs.    
However,   that   confidence   in   the   case   of   generic   prescription  
drugs   changed   in   June   2011   once   the   Supreme   Court   decided  
PLIVA,  Inc.  v.  Mensing.  
In  Mensing,   the   plaintiffs  were   prescribed   the   brand-­‐‑name  
drug  Reglan   to   treat   their  digestive   tract  disorders   in   2001   and  
2002.39     Their  pharmacies  instead  dispensed  to  them  the  generic  
form  of  Reglan  –  metoclopramide  –  which  was  manufactured  by  
PLIVA,   Inc.40      After   taking   metoclopramide   for   years,   the  
plaintiffs   developed   tardive   dyskinesia,   a   severe   neurological  
disorder  consisting  of  involuntary  repetitive  movements,  which  
is  often  irreversible.41  
The  manufacturer   of   Reglan   changed   the   drug’s  warnings  
several  times  over  the  course  of  a  number  of  years  to  include  the  
possibility   of   tardive   dyskinesia   as   a   side   effect.      In   1985,   the  
warning   label   cautioned   that   “‘tardive   dyskinesia  .  .  .   may  
develop   in   patients   treated   with   metoclopramide,’   and   the  
drug’s   package   insert   added   that   ‘[t]herapy   longer   than   12  
weeks  has  not  been  evaluated  and  cannot  be  recommended.’”42    
In   2004,   the   manufacturer   added   to   its   warnings   that   Reglan  
should   not   be   used   for   more   than   12   weeks   because   of   the  
 
   37.     Id.  at  575.  
   38.     Medtronic,  Inc.  v.  Lohr,  518  U.S.  470,  485  (1996).  
   39.     PLIVA,  Inc.  v.  Mensing,  131  S.Ct.  2567,  2573  (2011).    
   40.     Id.    
   41.   The   Nat’l   Insts.   of   Neurological   Disorders   and   Stroke,      NINDS   Tardive  
Dyskinesia  Information  Page,  NAT’L  INSTS.  OF  HEALTH  (Oct.  4,  2011),  
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/tardive/tardive.htm.  
   42.     Mensing,   131   S.Ct.   at   2572   (quoting   PHYSICIAN’S   DESK   REFERENCE   1635-­‐‑6  
(41st  ed.  1987).  
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disorder.43      In  2009,   the  FDA  ordered   its  strongest  warning,   the  
“black  box  warning,”  on  Reglan,  stating  that  treatment  with  the  
drug   can   cause   tardive   dyskinesia   and   that   “[t]reatment   with  
metoclopramide  for  longer  than  12  weeks  should  be  avoided  in  
all  but  rare  cases.”44  
However,  in  2001-­‐‑2002  when  the  plaintiffs  first  began  taking  
metoclopramide,   the   label   still   carried   the   1985   warning   that  
patients  who   took   the   drug   “may   develop”   tardive   dyskinesia  
and   that   treatment  with   the   drug   had   not   been   evaluated   and  
could   not   have   been   recommended   for   longer   than   twelve  
weeks.45      The   plaintiffs   had   been   taking   metoclopramide   for  
several  years  when  they  sued  PLIVA,  and  they  argued  that  there  
existed   a   great   deal   of   evidence   that   tardive   dyskinesia   was   a  
major  risk  of  metoclopramide,  but  that  its  label  did  not  indicate  
such  a  correspondingly  serious  threat  at  the  time.46  
Although   state   law   in   the   plaintiffs’   respective   states  
required  prescription  drug  manufacturers  to  adequately  warn  of  
their   drugs’   dangers,   federal   law,   according   to   the   Court   in  
Mensing,   did   not   require   a   manufacturer   of   a   generic  
prescription  drug   to  upgrade   the  warnings   in   the  drug’s   FDA-­‐‑
approved   label   to   reflect   new   information   about   the   drug’s  
dangers.47     Even  though  the  Wyeth  decision  in  effect  means  that  
federal   law   does   not   preempt   state   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn  
claims   involving   a   brand-­‐‑name   prescription   drug,   the   Court  
concluded   in  Mensing   that   the  Wyeth   decision   only   applied   to  
brand-­‐‑name   pharmaceutical   manufacturers,   not   generic   ones,  
and  that  Wyeth  therefore  was  not  controlling.48  
In  Mensing,   the   Court   supported   its   holding   by   reasoning  
that   it   was   impossible   for   the   generic   drug   manufacturer   to  
change   its   warning   label   on   its   own   without   the   FDA’s  
assistance   and   that   it   could  not   have  used   the  CBE  process   for  
 
   43.     Id.  
   44.     Id.  at  2573  (quoting  PHYSICIAN’S  DESK  REFERENCE  2902  (35th  ed.  2011).  
   45.     Id.  at  2572.  
   46.     Id.  at  2573.  
   47.     Id.  at  2577-­‐‑78.  
   48.     Id.  at  2581.  
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the   generic   drug.49      Specifically,   the   Court   stated   that   “federal  
law  would  permit  the  [generic]  [m]anufacturers  to  comply  with  
the  state   labeling  requirements   if,  and  only   if,   the  FDA  and  the  
brand-­‐‑name  manufacturer   changed   the  brand-­‐‑name   label   to  do  
so.”50    In  Mensing,  even  though  the  plaintiffs  had  been  given  the  
generic   drug,   the   corresponding   brand-­‐‑name   manufacturer   of  
the  drug  had  not  changed  the  label,  so  the  Court  concluded  that  
the  generic  manufacturer  could  not  change  the  label  either.51  
The  Supreme  Court   also  based   the  Mensing  decision  on   its  
interpretation   of   the   U.S.   Constitution’s   Supremacy   Clause,  
which  states   that   federal   law  “shall  be   the   supreme  Law  of   the  
Land  .  .  .   any  Thing   in   the  Constitution  or  Laws  of  any  State   to  
the  Contrary  notwithstanding.”52     Reasoning   that   federal   law   is  
supreme  over   state   law  –      even   if   the   state   law  made   the  drug  
safer  because  of  stricter  warning  label  requirements  –  the  Court  
found   that   federal   statutory   preemption   of   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑
adequately-­‐‑warn   claims   involving   a   generic   prescription   drug  
was  thus  final.    With   all   due   respect   to   the   Court,   there   exist  
many   problems   with   the   Court’s   reasoning   and   decision   in  
Mensing  which  the  following  section  explores.  
IV.   PROBLEMS  WITH  THE  MENSING  DECISION  
Justice  Thomas  wrote   the  opinion  of   the  Court   in  Mensing,  
even   though   he   concurred   in   the   judgment   in   Wyeth.    
Unfortunately,  Justice  Thomas  gives  no  clear  indication  why  he  
changed   his   stance   on   the   subject   of   pharmaceutical   drug  
preemption   in  Mensing,   nor   does   he   adequately   explain   why  
there   should  even  be  a  difference  between   the  ways   the  FDCA  
treats   generic   and   brand-­‐‑name   prescription   drugs.      The  
following  paragraphs  examine  the  Court’s  reasoning  in  Mensing,  
explain  why  the  reasoning   is  erroneous,  and  articulate  how  the  
Court  could  have  reached  a  different,  better  result.  
 
   49.     See  infra  Part  IV  (full  discussion  of  the  Mensing  reasoning).  
   50.     Mensing,  131  S.Ct.  at  2578.  
   51.     Id.  at  2575.    
   52.     U.S.  CONST.,  art.  VI,  cl.  2.  
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The   FDA   requires   that   generic   pharmaceutical  
manufacturers   must   always   have   the   same   warning   labels   as  
their  brand-­‐‑name  counterparts.53    In  Mensing,  the  Court  deferred  
to  the  FDA’s  interpretation  of  the  CBE  regulation,  which  is  that  
generic  manufacturers  may  only  change  a  drug’s  label  “to  match  
an   updated   brand-­‐‑name   label   or   to   follow   the   FDA’s  
instructions,”   and   ultimately   concluded   that   a   generic  
pharmaceutical  manufacturer  may  not  change  its  warning  label,  
even   via   the   CBE   process.54      The   main   difference   between   the  
Wyeth  decision  and  the  Mensing  decision,  then,  is  the  fact  that  it  
was   possible   for   a   brand-­‐‑name   manufacturer   (Wyeth)   to  
unilaterally  comply  with  state  and  federal  law  by  using  the  CBE  
process,  but   that   it  was  not  possible   for  a  generic  manufacturer  
(PLIVA)  to  do  so  because  of  the  generic  manufacturer’s  need  to  
rely  on   the   label  of   the  corresponding  brand-­‐‑name  drug.55     The  
Court  consequently  reasoned  that  because  it  was  impossible  for  
a   generic   drug  manufacturer   to   comply  with   both   federal   and  
state   law,   federal   law   therefore   statutorily   preempted   the  
plaintiffs’  failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn  claims  in  Mensing56  
Similarly,  the  Court  in  Mensing  held  that  PLIVA,  the  generic  
manufacturer,  would  not  have  been  allowed  by  FDA  regulations  
to  send  a  “Dear  Doctor”   letter   to  physicians  with  new  warning  
information.57      The   FDA   asserted   that   “if   generic   drug  
manufacturers,  but  not  the  brand-­‐‑name  manufacturer,  sent  such  
letters,   that   would   inaccurately   imply   a   therapeutic   difference  
between   the   brand   and   generic   drugs   and   thus   could   be  
impermissibly   ‘misleading.’”58      Consequently,   the   Court   in  
Mensing  deferred  to  the  FDA’s  stance  on  this   issue  as  well,  and  
used  it  to  support  its  ultimate  conclusion.  
Even  though  PLIVA,  as  a  generic  manufacturer,  apparently  
could  not  have  used  either  the  CBE  process  or  the  “Dear  Doctor”  
 
   53.     Mensing,  131  S.Ct.  at  2575.  
   54.     Id.  
   55.     Id.  at  2571.  
   56.     Id.  at  2576.    
   57.     Id.  at  2581.  
   58.     Id.  at  2576.  
FINALCOPY.MARKEY.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   2/20/14    2:13  PM  
148   MARQUETTE  ELDER’S  ADVISOR   [Vol.  15  
letter  to  notify  consumers  or  their  doctors  of  a  proposed  updated  
metoclopramide   label,   PLIVA   still   was   required   to   propose   a  
stronger   warning   label   to   the   FDA   if   it   believed   the   drug  
warranted   it.59      The   FDA   mandates   that   “[g]eneric   drug  
manufacturers   that   become   aware   of   safety   problems  must   ask  
the  agency   to  work   toward  strengthening   the   label   that  applies  
to   both   the   generic   and   brand-­‐‑name   equivalent   drug.”60    
Furthermore,   “[i]f   a   [generic   drug  manufacturer]   believes   new  
safety   information   should   be   added   to   a   product’s   labeling,   it  
should  contact  [the]  FDA,  and  [the]  FDA  will  determine  whether  
the  labeling  for  the  generic  and  listed  drugs  should  be  revised.”61    
Nevertheless,   PLIVA   never   notified   the   FDA   that   it   believed   a  
stronger  warning  was  required  for  metoclopramide  or  asked  the  
FDA  to  strengthen  the  label  that  applied  to  both  the  brand-­‐‑name  
and  the  generic  drug.62  
Through  contacting  the  FDA  about  the  need  for  a  change  in  
the  metoclopramide   label   this  way,  PLIVA  may  have  been  able  
to   comply   with   both   federal   and   state   law.      Nevertheless,   the  
Court   in  Mensing   rejected   this   theory   as   a   basis   for   permitting  
the   plaintiff   Mensing’s   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn   claim.    
Instead,   the   Court   stated   that   it   was   impossible   for   PLIVA   to  
abide  by  both  state  and  federal  regulations63  because  the  generic  
manufacturer   would   have   violated   federal   law   if   it   had  
independently   changed   its   labels   to   satisfy   its   state-­‐‑law   duty.64    
Thus,   the   Court   found   in   Mensing   that   even   if   the   generic  
manufacturer  had  attached  a  safer  label  to  its  metoclopramide,  it  
still   would   have   been   in   violation   of   federal   law   because   the  
label  would  have  been  different  from  the  corresponding  brand-­‐‑
name  drug  Reglan’s  label.65  
The   Court’s   reasoning   here   is   problematic,   however,  
 
   59.     Id.  
   60.     Id  (emphasis  added).  
   61.     Id.  at  2577.  
   62.     Id.  at  2578.  
   63.     Id.  at  2577.  
   64.     Id.  at  2578.  
   65.     Id.  at  2570.  
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because   the  Court   fails   to  acknowledge   that  PLIVA  could  have  
complied   with   federal   and   state   law   in   this   situation.     Wyeth  
provides   that,   absent   any   clear   evidence   that   the   FDA   would  
have   rejected   the   proposed   label   changes,   the   Court   will   not  
conclude   impossibility   in   complying   with   federal   and   state  
regulations.66      Unfortunately,   the   Court   in  Mensing   defies   this  
principle   by   inventing   a   new   preemption   rule,67   according   to  
Justice   Sotomayor,   when   it   states   “[t]he   question   for  
‘impossibility’   is  whether   the   private   party   could   independently  
do  under  federal  law  what  state  law  requires  of  it.”68    Because  a  
generic  manufacturer,  such  as  PLIVA,  is  dependent  on  the  FDA  
for  approval  before   it  may  change  its  warning  labels,   the  Court  
then   held   that   it   would   have   been   impossible   for   a   generic  
manufacturer   to   comply   with   both   state   and   federal   law  
“independently”  without  the  FDA’s  intervention.69    However,  as  
Justice   Sotomayor   points   out,   the   test   of   a   generic   drug  
manufacturer’s  “independence”  of  action  
has  no  basis  in  our  precedents.    The  majority  cites  only  
Wyeth   in   support   of   its   test.      As   discussed   above,  
however,  Wyeth  does  not  stand  for  the  proposition  that  
it   is   impossible   to   comply  with   both   federal   and   state  
law  whenever  federal  agency  approval  is  required.    To  
the   contrary,   label   changes   by   brand-­‐‑name  
manufacturers   such   as   Wyeth   are   subject   to   FDA  
review   and   acceptance.  .  .And,   even   if  Wyeth   could   be  
characterized   as   turning   on   the   fact   that   the   brand-­‐‑
name  manufacturer  could  change   its   label  unilaterally,  
the   possibility   of   unilateral   action   was,   at   most,   a  
sufficient   condition   for   rejecting   the   impossibility  
defense  in  that  case.    Wyeth  did  not  hold  that  unilateral  
action  is  a  necessary  condition  in  every  case.70  
As  Justice  Sotomayor  states,  this  new  principle  that  requires  
a   drug  manufacturer’s   ability   to   act   “independently”   from   the  
FDA  before   a   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately  warn   claim   can   be   allowed  
 
   66.     Wyeth,  555  U.S.  at  571.  
   67.     Mensing,  131  S.  Ct.  at  2589.  
   68.     Id.    (Sotomayor,  J.,  dissenting)  (emphasis  added).  
   69.     Id.  
   70.     Id.  at  2589-­‐‑90.  
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under   the   FDCA   is   unprecedented.      Thus,   the   only   way   the  
Court  may  arrive  at  its  result  is  by  improperly  creating  this  new  
standard   “out   of   thin   air”   for   generic   drug   manufacturers.71    
Furthermore,   this   new   standard   directly   contradicts   common  
sense   that   taking   action   to   make   patients   safer   –   such   as  
improving  a  warning  label—would  be  a  violation  of  federal  law.  
The  most   significant  problem  with   the  Mensing   decision   is  
that  the  Court  should  have  required  the  defendant  generic  drug  
manufacturer   to  prove   that   the  FDA  would  not  have  approved  
the   label   change   in   order   to   find   the   impossibility   that   led   the  
Court  to  find  federal  statutory  preemption  of  the  claims.    As  the  
Court   in   Wyeth   states,   “[i]mpossibility   pre-­‐‑emption   is   a  
demanding   defense,”   and   the   Court’s   decision   in   that   case  
turned  on  the  defendant’s  failure  to  demonstrate  impossibility  of  
simultaneously   following   federal   and   state   law.72      In  Mensing  
though,   the   Court   did   not   require   the   defendant   to   prove   that  
the   FDA   would   not   have   approved   a   change   in   the   generic’s  
label  which  would  have  provided  for  impossibility  in  following  
both   federal   and   state   law.      Instead,   it   simply   decided   that  
because   the   defendant   was   dependent   on   the   FDA   for   label  
approval,   the   fact   that   it   could   not   “independently”   fulfill   its  
state  duties  was  enough  to  satisfy  impossibility.73    However,  this  
is   problematic   because   without   proving   that   the   FDA   would  
have   rejected   the   label   change,   there   only   exists   a   mere  
“possibility”   that   state   and   federal   law   would   have   been   at  
odds.74    As  Justice  Sotomayor  states  in  her  dissent  in  Mensing,  
had   the   [m]anufacturers   invoked   the   available  
mechanism   for   initiating   label   changes,   they  may  well  
have  been  able   to  change  their   labels   in  sufficient   time  
to   warn   respondents.      Having   failed   to   do   so,   the  
[m]anufacturers   cannot   sustain   their   burden.  .  .to  
demonstrate  that  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  comply  
with   both   federal   and   state   law.      At   most,   they   have  
demonstrated   only   a   ‘hypothetical   or   potential  
 
   71.     Id.  at  2582.  
   72.     Wyeth  v.  Levine,  555  U.S.  555,  573  (2009).  
   73.     PLIVA,  Inc.  v.  Mensing,  131  S.Ct.  2567,  2581-­‐‑2  (2011).  
   74.     Id.  at  2582.  
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conflict.’75  
Even   though   PLIVA   failed   to   invoke   the   mechanism   for  
changing  metoclopramide’s  warning   label,   PLIVA  nevertheless  
prevailed   –   being   shielded   from   the   plaintiffs’   claims   without  
even  meeting  its  burden  of  proof.  
The   Court   also   uses   the   “non   obstante”   provision   of   the  
Supremacy   Clause,   “any   [state   law]   to   the   [c]ontrary  
notwithstanding,”  to  support  its  holding.76    The  Court  reasons  in  
Mensing   that   this   clause   suggests   that   “federal   law   should   be  
understood   to   impliedly   repeal   conflicting   state   law”   and   that  
“courts   should   not   strain   to   find  ways   to   reconcile   federal   law  
with  seemingly  conflicting  state  law.”77    However,  this  reasoning  
contradicts  the  long-­‐‑held  idea  that  federal  statutory  preemption  
of  state  law  is  not  to  be  assumed  unless  there  is  a  clear  indication  
that  Congress  intends  preemption.78    Given  that  there  is  no  such  
indication  in  the  FDCA,  as  it  was  explained  in  Wyeth,79  the  Court  
should   not   have   used   the   “non   obstante”   clause   in  Mensing   to  
support  preemption  of  the  plaintiffs’  claims.  
If  Mensing  has  correctly  interpreted  the  FDCA  as  regulating  
brand-­‐‑name   and   generic   prescription   drugs   differently   with  
respect   to  how  changes   in  warnings   and   labels   on  prescription  
drugs  can  be  made,  then,  as  Section  VIII  of  this  paper  discusses  
in   more   detail,   the   FDCA   violates   the   Equal   Protection  
component   of   the   Fifth   Amendment’s   Due   Process   clause  
because   this   difference   is   irrational.80      As   discussed   in   more  
detail   in   subpart   C   infra,   the   Supreme   Court   presumes   that  
Congress   does   not   intend   a   federal   statute   it   enacts   to   have  
absurd   results81,   but   the   interpretation  of   the  FDCA   in  Mensing  
results   in   absurd   and   irrational   differences   in   how   the   FDCA  
 
   75.     Id.   at   2587-­‐‑88   (quoting   Rice   v.   Norman   Williams   Co.,   458   U.S.   654,   659  
(1982)).  
   76.     Id.  at  2579.  
   77.     Id.  at  2580.  
   78.     Wyeth  v.  Levine,  555  U.S.  555,  574  (2009).  
   79.     Id.  at  574-­‐‑75.  
   80.     See  infra  Part  IV.C.  
   81.     Mensing,  131  S.Ct.  at  2582.    
FINALCOPY.MARKEY.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   2/20/14    2:13  PM  
152   MARQUETTE  ELDER’S  ADVISOR   [Vol.  15  
regulates  warnings  and  labels  of  brand-­‐‑name  and  generic  drugs.    
The   Supreme   Court   also   presumes   that   Congress   does   not  
intend   to   enact   a   statute   that   violates   the   United   States  
Constitution.    So,  the  Court  usually  interprets  a  federal  statute  in  
a   manner   that   avoids   the   statute   violating   the   Constitution  
unless  it  is  clear  that  Congress  intended  such  an  interpretation.82    
The  Court  in  Mensing  should  have  applied  this  principle  to  infer  
that  Congress  did  not  mean  to  discriminate  between  generic  and  
brand-­‐‑name  prescription  drugs  in  the  FDCA  to  the  detriment  of  
the  public,  which   is  how   the  Court   construes  Congress’s   intent  
in  Mensing.83      This   paper   discusses   this   topic   further   in   section  
VIII.  
With  this  general  overview  of  the  holding  and  reasoning  in  
Mensing  as  background,  the  next  three  subsections  explore  some  
of  the  specific  problematic  implications  of  the  Mensing  decision.    
The  first  of  the  three  addresses  how  the  removal  of  brand-­‐‑name  
pharmaceuticals   from   the  market   impacts   consumers,   the   next  
discusses  how  a  consumer  may  wind  up   taking  a  generic  drug  
even  though  the  consumer’s  physician  has  prescribed  the  brand-­‐‑
name   drug,   and   the   last   examines   equal   protection   problems  
presented   by   Mensing’s   application   of   federal   statutory  
preemption  of  state  tort  law.  
A.   BRAND  NAMES  OFF  THE  MARKET  
One   major   problem   with   the   holding   in   Mensing   is   that  
certain   brand-­‐‑name   drugs   may   be   off   the   market   now.    
According   to   a   recent   article   discussing   the  Mensing   decision,  
“[a]bout   a   third   of   generic   drugs   have   no   brand-­‐‑name  
competitors.”84    This  situation  presents  a  variety  of  implications.    
One   is   that   the   corresponding   generic   drug   still   in   the  market  
 
   82.     See  Solid  Waste  Agency  of  N.  Cook  Cnty  v.  U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Engineers,  
531  U.S.  159,  160  (2001).  
   83.     John   F.   Manning,   The   Absurdity   Doctrine,   116   HARV.   L.   REV.   2387,   2432  
(2003).  
   84.     Bill   Mears,  High   Court   Sides   with   Generic   Drug   Makers   in   Narrow   Ruling,  
CNN  (Jun.  23,  2011,  6:04  PM),    
http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/06/23/  scotus.generic.drugs/index.html.    
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would  be  a  patient’s  only  option.    Another  implication  is  that,  as  
a   result   of   the  Mensing   decision,   there  would  be  no  way   that   a  
generic  manufacturer  would   be   able,   on   its   own,   to   amend   its  
warning  for  the  increased  safety  of   its  consumers  because  of   its  
need   to   rely   on   the   warning   label   of   a   brand-­‐‑name-­‐‑
manufactured  drug  that  no  longer  even  exists.  
Even   if   a   brand-­‐‑name  prescription  drug   leaves   the  market  
after  its  patent  expires,  and  all  that  is  left  is  on  the  market  is  the  
generic  equivalent,  it  is  significant  that  the  generic  manufacturer  
would  still  have  no  duty   to  provide  additional  warnings  about  
newly-­‐‑discovered  risks  of  the  drug.    This  means  that  consumers  
potentially  could  be  adversely  affected  by  the  drug  in  ways  that  
are  not  warned  about  in  the  drug’s  label  –  even  though  there  is  
still  a  real  possibility  that  harmful  effects  of  the  drug  have  been  
found   –   but   consumers  would   have   no   legal   recourse.      Under  
Mensing,   bringing  a   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn   claim  would  be  
impossible  for  those  patients  injured  by  a  generic  drug,  since  the  
generic   manufacturer   would   have   no   way   to   change   its   label,  
given   that   the   brand-­‐‑name   no   longer   exists.      The   generic  
manufacturer   would   be   prevented   from   ever   being   sued   for  
failure   to   provide   adequate   warnings   because   the   FDCA  
prohibits   it   from  making  any  unilateral  changes  to  its  warnings  
that  may  be  helpful   to   its   consumers.     This   seems   to  contradict  
common  sense  and  generates  an  absurd  result.  
Furthermore,  the  practice  of  requiring  a  generic  to  follow  a  
brand   name   warning   label   could   discourage   generic  
manufacturers   from   making   known   the   harmful   effects   of   the  
generic   drug.      There   certainly   exist   positive   reasons   for   the  
requirement   of   total   label   similarity,   such   as   the   disclosure   of  
actual  viable  harms  and  reassuring  the  consumer  that  the  drugs  
are   the   same.      On   the   other   hand,   if   a   generic   manufacturer  
discovers   harm   about   its   particular   drug,   but   the   brand   name  
manufacturer  does  not,  federal  law  does  not  require  the  generic  
manufacturer  to  change  its  warning  label.    This  disparity  may  in  
fact   encourage   the   generic   manufacturer   to   stay   silent   and  
refrain  from  speaking  up  when  it  discovers  a  problem  presented  
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by  the  drug.85  
In   this   same   vein,   a   manufacturer   of   a   brand-­‐‑name  
pharmaceutical   drug  may   use   federal   law   as   a   good   reason   to  
conduct  its  own  studies  regarding  the  harms  its  drug  causes.    As  
Steven   Rotman   notes   in   his   article   on   epidemiology   and  
pharmaceutical   litigation,   “when   pharmaceutical   companies  
sponsor   case-­‐‑control   studies   to   investigate   whether   their   drug  
causes  a  disease  or  injury,  they  often  do  so  under  pressure  from  
the   FDA   and   usually   design   the   studies   to   be   marginal   on  
power.      By   doing   this,   they   save  money   and,  more   important,  
are  more   likely  to  miss  detecting  a  result  associating  their  drug  
with  the  disease.  .  .”86  
Likewise,  in  weak  studies,  “if  there  is  a  result  that  associates  
a  drug  with  a  disease,  defendants  will  be  able  to  argue  that  the  
results   are   not   statistically   significant   or   that   the   numbers   are  
small   or   ‘fragile.’”87      In   other   words,   by   setting   up   their   own  
studies,  pharmaceutical  companies  can  defend  themselves  either  
way  to  demonstrate  their  drug’s  weak  correlation  with  harm.  
Justice   Sotomayor   makes   a   number   of   compelling  
arguments   regarding   some   of   these   problems   in   her   dissent   in  
Mensing.    She  points  out  that  in  Wyeth,  the  Court  recognized  that  
“manufacturers  have  superior  access   to   information  about   their  
drugs,   especially   in   the   post   marketing   phase   as   new   risks  
emerge,”88   and   that   therefore   “[f}ederal   law   thus   obliges   drug  
manufacturers  –  both  brand-­‐‑name  and  generic  –   to  monitor  the  
safety   of   their   products.”89      This   view  makes  more   sense   as   it  
properly   holds   accountable   those   manufacturers   who   fail   to  
warn  about  drug  harm  or  who  otherwise  equivocate.     After  all,  
our  justice  system  was  designed  to  do  exactly  that,  and  the  court  
should  retain  such  an  avenue  for  recourse.  
 
   85.     Mensing,  131  S.Ct.  at  at  2592.  
   86.     Steven  Rotman,  Don’t  Know  Much  About  Epidemiology?,  TRIAL,  Sept.  2007,  at  
33-­‐‑34.  
   87.     Id.    
   88.     Wyeth  v.  Levine,  555  U.S.  555,  578-­‐‑79.  (2009).  
   89.     Mensing,  131  S.Ct.  at  2584.  
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B.   TAKING  GENERICS  WITHOUT  KNOWLEDGE  
Another   significant   problem   caused   by   Mensing   is   that  
patients   can   be   given   generic   prescription   drugs   without   their  
knowledge.      Similar   to   what   happened   to   the   plaintiffs   in  
Mensing,   doctors   may   prescribe   brand-­‐‑name   drugs,   but   the  
pharmacist   may   simply   switch   the   brand-­‐‑name   for   a   generic  
prescription.      This   practice   is   commonplace,   and   is   even  
compulsory   in   some   states.90      Often   times,   a   patient   may   not  
even  know  or  realize  that  the  drug  he  or  she  has  been  given  is  in  
fact  a  generic.  
As   noted   above   in   the   summary   of   the  Mensing   decision,  
generic   manufacturers   are   allowed   to   abide   by   state   warning  
labeling  requirements  to  change  the  warning  information  only  if  
the  FDA  has  approved  the  corresponding  brand-­‐‑name  warning  
change.91      A   doctor   may   prescribe   a   brand-­‐‑name   prescription  
drug   to   a  patient,   but   if   that   brand-­‐‑name  drug   is   no   longer   on  
the  market,  the  pharmacy  will  automatically  fill  the  prescription  
with  the  generic  drug.92    However,  as  stated  in  Section  A  of  this  
paper,   if   that   generic   drug   manufacturer   has   found   harmful  
effects   of   the   drug,   it   still   cannot   change   its   warning   label  
because   of   its   need   to   rely   on   the   brand-­‐‑name   manufacturer  
which   no   longer   exists.      Thus,   if   no   worrisome   information  
about  the  drug  makes  its  way  home  with  the  consumer  because  
the  generic  manufacturer   is  unable   to  change   its  warning   label,  
the  consumer  would  have  no  reason  to  think  that  the  very  drug  
he  or  she   is   ingesting   is  unsafe,  even  though  it  may  be.      Justice  
Sotomayor  remarks  on  this  result  in  her  dissent  in  Mensing:  “As  
a   result   of   today’s   decision,   whether   a   consumer   harmed   by  
inadequate   warnings   can   obtain   relief   turns   solely   on   the  
happenstance  of  whether  her  pharmacist   filled  her  prescription  
with  a  brand-­‐‑name  or  generic  drug.”93     She  goes  further  to  note  
 
   90.     Id.  at  2583.  
   91.     Id.  at  2578.  
   92.     Id.  at  2583.  
   93.     Id.  
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that   even   the  majority  of   the  Court   acknowledges   that   such  an  
outcome  “makes  little  sense.”94  
C.   FEDERAL  STATUTORY  PREEMPTION  OF  STATE  TORT  LAW  AND  
EQUAL  PROTECTION  
It  is  well  known  that  congressional  intent  does  matter  when  
courts   interpret   a   federal   statute.      According   to   the   Supreme  
Court,  “‘[t]he  purpose  of  Congress  is  the  ultimate  touchstone’  in  
every   pre-­‐‑emption   case.”95      In   Wyeth,   the   Supreme   Court  
confirmed   this   view,   noting   that   “‘all   evidence   of   Congress’  
purposes’   in  enacting  and  amending  the  FDCA  pointed  against  
[federal]   preemption.”96      Moreover,   the   FDCA–which   is   a  
linchpin  in  the  decisions  in  Wyeth  and  Mensing–lacks  an  express  
preemption  provision.97     Even   if   it  did   contain  one,   “where   the  
text  of   a  preemption   clause   is  open   to  more   than  one  plausible  
reading,  courts  ordinarily  ‘accept  the  reading  that  disfavors  pre-­‐‑
emption.’”98    
When   deciding   a   case,   the   Supreme   Court   is   supposed   to  
keep  in  mind  that  Congress  does  not  intend  absurd  results  from  
its   legislation.99     However,  when   the  Court  applied  preemption  
the  way  it  did  in  Mensing,  it  directly  and  effectively  gave  rise  to  
an   absurd   result:   allowing   brand   name   consumers   to   sue   for  
failure   to   adequately   warn,   but   preventing   generic   consumers  
from   doing   so,   regardless   of   the   fact   that   the   drugs   are  
substantively   equivalent.      In   Justice   Sotomayor’s   dissent,   she  
appropriately  addressed  this  issue.    She  reasoned  that  
‘If  Congress  had  intended  to  deprive  injured  parties  of  
[this]   long   available   form   of   compensation,   it   surely  
 
   94.     Id.    
   95.     Medtronic,   Inc.  v.  Lohr,   518  U.S.   470,   485   (1996)   (quoting  Retail  Clerks  v.  
Schermerhorn,  375  U.S.  96,  103  (1963).  
   96.     Louis  M.  Bograd,  W(h)ither  Preemption?,     TRIAL  ,  Nov.  2009,  at  26  (quoting  
Wyeth,  555  U.S.  at  574).  
   97.     Id.  at  24.  
   98.     Altria  Group,   Inc.  v.  Good,  555  U.S.  70,  101   (2008)   (quoting  Bates  v.  Dow  
Agrosciences,  544  U.S.  431,  449  (2005)).    
   99.     Manning,  supra  note  83,  at  2388,  2409.  
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would   have   expressed   that   intent   more   clearly.  .  .’  
Given   the   long-­‐‑standing   existence   of   product   liability  
ac-­‐‑tions,  including  for  failure  to  warn,  ‘[i]t  is  difficult  to  
believe   that   Congress   would,   without   comment,  
remove  all  means  of   judicial  recourse  for  those  injured  
by   illegal   conduct.  .  .’   In   concluding   that   Congress  
silently   immunized   generic   manufacturers   from   all  
failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑warn   claims,   the   majority   disregards   our  
previous  hesitance  to  infer  congressional  intent  to  effect  
such   a   sweeping   change   in   traditional   state-­‐‑law  
remedies.100  
Even   though   the   dissent   in  Mensing   recognized   that   “the  
historic  police  powers  of  the  States  [are]  not  to  be  superseded  by  
the  Federal  Act  unless   that  was   the  clear  and  manifest  purpose  
of  Congress,”   the  Court   allowed   federal   preemption  without   it  
being   the   clear   and   manifest   purpose   of   Congress.101      As   Dean  
Erwin   Chemerinsky   succinctly   states,   “there   is   no   indication  
whatsoever   that   Congress   meant   to   preempt   tort   liability   for  
generic   drugs   in   the   exact   same   situations   in  which   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑
warn   suits   can   be   brought   against   their   brand-­‐‑name  
equivalents.”102  
According   to   the   Due   Process   clause   of   the   Fifth  
Amendment,  “[n]o  person  shall.  .  .be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  
property  without  due  process  of  law.”103    The  Due  Process  clause  
impliedly   includes   equal   protection   of   the   laws   and   provides  
against   unjustifiable   discrimination   in   federal   laws.104    
Additionally,   the   rational   basis   test   is   the   usual   standard   by  
which   laws   are   measured   in   an   equal   protection   challenge105    
When  this  test  –  which  ensures  that  a  federal  statute  is  rationally  
related   to   the   purposes   it   serves   –   is   applied   in  Mensing,   one  
must   conclude   that   the   FDCA,   as   interpreted   by   Wyeth   and  
Mensing,  violates  equal  protection.  
 
   100.     Mensing,  131  S.Ct.  at  2592.    
   101.     Id.  at  2586  (Sotomayor,  J.,  dissenting)  (alteration  in  original)  (quoting  Rice  
v.  Santa  Fe  Elevator  Corp.,  331  U.S.  218,  230  (1947)).      
   102.     Chemerinsky,  supra  note  9,  at  56.  
   103.     U.S.  CONST.  amend.  V.    
   104.     United  States  v.  Thoresen,  428  F.2d  654,  658  (9th  Cir.  1970).  
   105.     U.S.  v.  Carolene  Products  Co.,  304  U.S.  152  (1938).    
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A  court  conducting  a  rational  basis  review  first  looks  at  how  
the  government  has  defined   the  group   that   is  burdened  by   the  
law.106    Next,  it  looks  at  the  goal  that  is  seeking  to  be  achieved  by  
the   law.107      Finally,   it   should   ensure   that   there   is   a   sufficient  
nexus   between   the   end   result   and   the   means   to   arrive   at   the  
end.108    Rational  basis  review  presumes  that  a  challenged  statute  
is  valid,  and  puts   the  burden  on   the  plaintiff   to  prove   that   it   is  
impermissibly  discriminatory.109  
When  one  examines  federal  statutory  preemption  of  generic  
but   not   brand-­‐‑name  pharmaceutical   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑warn   claims,   the  
group   burdened   by   the  Mensing   Court’s   interpretation   of   the  
FDCA   is   quite   clearly   generic   pharmaceutical   consumers.   The  
goal   seeking   to   be   achieved   by   the   distinction   between   brand-­‐‑
name   and   generics   is   unclear,   so   the   rational   basis   test   is   not  
satisfied   because   of   such   uncertainty   as   to   the   reason   for   the  
distinction.      Therefore,   there   is   no   valid   reason   to   distinguish  
between   generics   and   brand-­‐‑names   in   federal   preemption  
failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑warn  claims,  and  doing   so  would  produce  an  absurd  
result,  which  Congress  could  not  have  intended.  
Through   this   analysis,   it   is   apparent   how   the   Supreme  
Court   has   effectively   denied   equal   protection   of   the   laws   to  
generic  prescription  consumers.     Generics  and  brand-­‐‑names  are  
essentially   the   same  and  are   recognized   as   such,   so   there   is   no  
rational  basis  to  treat  them  any  differently  in  litigation.    Because  
brand-­‐‑name   and   generic   drugs   are   interchangeable   by  doctors,  
pharmacists,   the   FDA,   and   consumers   alike,   and   because   they  
are  substantively  the  same  as  each  other  effect-­‐‑wise  on  the  body,  
there  is  no  reason  for  them  to  be  distinguished  from  each  other  
under  the  FDCA.    Nevertheless,  the  Mensing  decision  interprets  
the   FDCA   as   regulating   brand-­‐‑name   and   generic   prescription  
drugs  in  a  different  manner,  thus  violating  equal  protection.  
 
   106.     GEOFFREY  R.  STONE  ET  AL,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  489  (6th  ed.  2009).    
   107.     Id.  
   108.     Id.  
   109.     Id.  
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V.   GROUPS  MOST  NEGATIVELY  AFFECTED  BY  MENSING  
Even  though  the  Mensing  decision  affects  the  overwhelming  
majority  of  Americans  who  take  any  prescription  drug,  it  will  hit  
hardest   those   persons   who   have   little   autonomy   in   the   choice  
between  brand-­‐‑name  and  generic  drugs.    Included  in  this  group  
are   persons  with   low   income,   those  with   little   or   no   insurance  
coverage,  and  the  poverty-­‐‑stricken.    Three  subgroups  with  such  
little   autonomy   who   are   disproportionately   harmed   by   the  
Mensing  decision  are  women,  minorities,  and  the  elderly.  
A.   WOMEN  
Various   research   studies   have   demonstrated   that   women  
may  be  more  likely  to  be  harmed  by  pharmaceutical  drugs  than  
men.110     This   fact  would  suggest,   then,   that  women  will  also  be  
more   disproportionately   affected   by   the  Mensing   decision   than  
their  male  counterparts.  
The  biological  and  anatomical  differences  between  the  sexes  
sometimes   affect   the  way  pharmaceuticals  metabolize   in  men’s  
and   women’s   bodies.      In   the   liver,   where   most   prescription  
drugs   are   metabolized   by   the   body,   certain   drugs   are   cleared  
faster   by   men,   and   others   are   cleared   faster   by   women.111    
Differences   in   sex   affect   even   those   drugs   that   happen   to   be  
“within   the   same   pharmacological   class   and   drugs   with   the  
same  structures.”112  
Because   there   can   be   such   varied   reactions   to  
pharmaceuticals  in  men  and  women,  it  is  important  to  note  that  
women  have  not  always  been  the  primary  focus  of  drug  studies.    
Until  very  recently,  women  have  been  underrepresented  in  drug  
trials.      The   General   Accounting   Office’s   report,   “Women   in  
 
   110.     OFFIE  P.  SOLDIN  ET  AL.,  SEX  DIFFERENCES  IN  DRUG  DISPOSITION  2  (Stelvio  M.  
Bandiera   eds.,   2011),   available   at   http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/  
PMC3051160/pdf/JBB2011-­‐‑187103.pdf.    
   111.     THERESA   M.   WIZEMANN   &   MARY-­‐‑LOU   PARDUE,   EXPLORING   THE  
BIOLOGICAL  CONTRIBUTIONS  TO  HUMAN  HEALTH:  DOES  SEX  MATTER?  125  (2001).  
   112.     Id.    
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Clinical  Drug  Trials,”  notes  that  as  recently  as  1992,  the  FDA  had  
failed  to  adequately  ensure  that  women  were  being  represented  
in   medical   drug   studies   and   that   sex   differences   were   being  
sufficiently  studied  in  pharmaceutical  drug  trials.113  
Limited   attention   to   the   specific   ways   women’s   bodies  
handle   some   types  of  pharmaceuticals  may  be  one   reason  why  
adverse  reactions  and  other  harms  tend  to  be  more  prevalent  in  
women   than   men.      Although   the   monitoring   of   this   issue   has  
improved  over  the  past  two  decades,  some  doctors  and  scientists  
continue   to   express   concern   over   the   degree   of   analysis  
regarding   women’s   reactions   to   such   drugs,   and   they   suggest  
that  more  research  should  be  conducted  on  the  topic.114  
If  drug  studies  have  historically  examined  mainly  men  and  
lacked   sufficient   attention   to   women,   as   the   GAO   report  
suggests,  then  it  is  no  wonder  that  women  have  a  higher  rate  of  
adverse  reactions  to  prescription  drugs.    In  fact,  female  patients  
have  1.5  to  1.7  times  greater  risk  than  male  patients  of  suffering  
an   adverse   reaction   to   their   prescription   drugs.115      Catherine  
White,  an  Associate  Professor  of  Pharmaceutical  and  Biomedical  
Sciences  at  the  University  of  Georgia,  summarizes  the  issue  well:  
“Since   ‘sex/gender   clearly   influences   the   pharmacokinetics   of  
some  drugs,  it  should  also  be  expected  to  play  a  significant  role  
in   the   incidence   and   severity  of  drug   interactions.’”116      Because  
the   effects  of  prescription  drugs  on  women   in  particular   fail   to  
be  fully  comprehended,  it  is  likely  that  discord  between  women  
and   their   prescriptions   will   persist   as   long   as   this   is   the   case,  
making  women  more  likely  to  be  harmed  by  prescription  drugs  
and  to  file  claims  against  pharmaceutical  companies.  
Unique   to   women   are   some   of   the   bodily   changes   they  
undergo   in   life.     Women  obviously  have  different   reproductive  
 
   113.     U.S.   GOV’T   ACCOUNTABILITY   OFFICE,   GAO-­‐‑01-­‐‑754,   WOMEN’S   HEALTH:  
WOMEN   SUFFICIENTLY  REPRESENTED   IN  NEW  DRUG  TESTING,   BUT   FDA  OVERSIGHT  
NEEDS  IMPROVEMENT  (2001).      
   114.     Id.    
   115.     Colleen  Fuller,  Women  and  Adverse  Drug  Reactions  Reporting  in  the  Canadian  
Context,  WOMEN  &  HEALTH  PROT.,  Oct.  2002,  at  20.  
   116.     Id.  
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functions   than   men;   menstruation   at   puberty   signals   the  
beginning  of  a  woman’s  ability  to  get  pregnant,  and  menopause  
signals  the  end  of   it.     For  a  number  of  decades,  these  particular  
stages   in   females’   lives   have   often  meant   pharmaceutical   drug  
regimens.      During   years   when   menstruation   still   takes   place,  
women   will   often   take   oral   contraceptives   or   employ   other  
means   of   pharmaceutical   birth   control   to   prevent   pregnancy,  
limit   the   size   of   their   families,   or   for   other   health   reasons.    
According   to   a   2002   government   survey,   about   eight   in   ten  
women   between   ages   fifteen   and   forty-­‐‑four   have   taken   a  
prescription  birth  control  pill  at  some  point  in  their  lives.117    Such  
widespread  use  of  the  pill  and  other  forms  of  contraception  can  
only  mean   that  most  women  will  eventually   take  some  kind  of  
prescription  drug.  
Lawsuits   involving   prescription   contraceptives   happen  
relatively   frequently   nowadays   and   direct   marketing   of   such  
prescription  drugs  to  consumers  is  a  growing  problem.    In  2005,  
the   pharmaceutical   manufacturing   industry   spent   over   $4.23  
billion   on   direct-­‐‑to-­‐‑consumer   advertising   while   total   spending  
on  drug  promotion  was  more  than  $29  billion.118  
In   one   particular   contraceptive   lawsuit,   Perez   v.   Wyeth,  
plaintiffs   brought   suit   against   the  manufacturer   of  Norplant,   a  
contraceptive  device  that  is  implanted  in  a  woman’s  upper  arm  
which   may   prevent   pregnancy   for   up   to   five   years.119      In   this  
Supreme   Court   of   New   Jersey   case,   plaintiffs   complained   that  
Wyeth’s   widespread   marketing   campaign   of   Norplant   was  
aimed  directly  at  women  and  that  its  marketing  practices  failed  
to   disclose   any   sort   of   complications   that   could   arise   from   the  
removal  of   the  device120      In   its  decision,   the  Court  held  that   the  
“learned   intermediary   rule,”   which   typically   discharges   any  
 
   117.     Rita  Rubin,  The  Pill:   50  Years   of  Birth  Control  Changed  Women’s  Lives,  USA  
TODAY,  May  7-­‐‑9,  2010  at  2A.  
   118.     Heather   Harrell,   Direct-­‐‑to-­‐‑Consumer   Advertising   of   Prescription  
Pharmaceuticals,  The  Learned  Intermediary  Doctrine,  and  Fiduciary  Duties,    
8  IND.  HEALTH  L.  REV.  71,  71  (2011).  
   119.     Perez  v.  Wyeth  Laboratories  Inc.,  734  A.2d  1245,  1247  (N.J.  1999).  
   120.     Id.  at  1248    
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manufacturer’s   duty   to   warn   users   directly   when   it   supplies  
information  on  harmful  effects  to  users’  doctors,  does  not  apply  
to   marketing   campaigns   like   Norplant’s   when   it   advertises  
directly   to   patients.121      The   Court   stated   that   when   a  
manufacturer  follows  such  a  practice,  it  still  has  a  duty  to  warn  
the   consumer   since   it   is   marketing   the   product   directly   to   the  
consumer.122  
Once   women   begin   menopause   they   may   use   hormone  
therapy   or   other   drugs   to   prevent   or   limit   certain   effects   of  
menopause   and   osteoporosis.      According   to   the   GAO   report,  
“[w]omen   metabolize   some   drugs   differently   if   they   are  
pregnant,   lactating,   pre-­‐‑   or   postmenopausal,   menstruating,   or  
using   oral   contraceptives   or   hormone   replacements.     Women’s  
generally   smaller   body  weight   compared   to  men   can   result   in  
higher  levels  of  drug  concentration  in  the  bloodstream.”123    Men  
do  not  have  to  go  through  either  of  these  processes;  they  cannot  
get   pregnant   and   their   bones   do   not   lose   calcium   at   the   same  
rate   as   women’s.      Accordingly,   there   is   nothing   exactly  
comparable   that   happens   to   men   that   may   involve   such   long-­‐‑
term  prescription  drug  use.  
Women   also   experience   certain   disorders   at   a   higher   rate  
than  men,  and  therefore  may  take  prescription  drugs  to  remedy  
those   disorders   more   often.      Depression   is   one   such   example.    
Serotonin,   one   of   the   body’s   natural   chemicals   that   creates  
feelings  of  happiness,  may  help  explain  some  of  the  discrepancy:  
its   synthesis   rates   have   been   found   to   be   52   percent   higher   in  
male   subjects   than   female   subjects.124      According   to   the  
researchers,   “this   marked   difference   in   rates   of   serotonin  
synthesis  could  contribute   to   the  higher   incidence   in  women  of  
major   unipolar   depression.”125      The   greater   prevalence   of  
depression  in  women  may  consequently  lead  them  to  take  even  
 
   121.     Id.   at   1257;   RESTATEMENT   (THIRD)   OF   TORTS:   PRODUCTS   LIABILITY   §   6(d)  
(1997).  
   122.     Id.  at  1246,  1263.  
   123.     U.S.  GOV’T  ACCOUNTABILITY  OFFICE,  supra  note  113,  at  7.  
   124.     WIZEMANN,  supra  note  111,  at  130.  
   125.     Id.  
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more  prescription  drugs  to  treat  the  depression,  thus  increasing  
women’s  risk  of  being  harmed  by  pharmaceuticals  and  initiating  
such  lawsuits.  
Opponents   of   this   paper’s   thesis   may   argue   that   just  
because   women   have   a   higher   risk   of   adverse   reaction   to  
prescription   drugs   does   not   necessarily   mean   that   women  
therefore   take   prescription   drugs   more   often   than   men.    
However,   this   higher   risk   faced   by   women   does   mean   that  
women   may   have   a   problem   with   a   prescription   drug   more  
often   than   men   and   that   they,   rather   than   men,   may   be  
disproportionately   affected,   making   the   likelihood   higher   that  
they  will  bring  suit  against  a  pharmaceutical  company.  
Other   sociological   factors   may   play   into   women’s   higher  
likelihood  of  taking  generic  instead  of  brand-­‐‑name  prescriptions.    
Women   tend   to   be   children’s   primary   caregivers,   and   single  
mothers,  especially,  may  be  the  sole  caregivers  for  their  children.    
Many   single   mothers   also   tend   to   be   on   the   lower   end   of   the  
economic   spectrum,   represent   a  majority  of   the  poor,   and  hold  
lower   education   levels   and   lower   incomes.126      In   fact,   it   was  
estimated   that   during   the   years   1969   through   1979,   women  
between  the  ages  of  twenty-­‐‑five  and  seventy-­‐‑five,  at  a  rate  of  20  
percent   to   35   percent,   had   experienced   or   would   experience  
poverty   at   some   point   in   their   lives.127      Because   of   the   need   to  
take   care   of   both   themselves   and   their   children   without  
supplemental   income,   single   mothers   may   experience   more  
strain   on   their   purse   strings   than   men,   thus   causing   them   to  
choose   generic   over   brand-­‐‑name   prescription   drugs   out   of  
necessity.  
All  of  these  various  factors  contribute  to  women’s  increased  
risk   of   pharmaceutical   harm   and   similarly   make   them   more  
likely  to  take  generic  prescription  drugs.    As  a  result,  women  as  
a   group   are   largely   directly   disadvantaged   by   the   Mensing  
decision.  
 
   126.     David   R.   Williams   &   Chiquita   Collins,   U.S.   Socioeconomic   and   Racial  
Differences  in  Health:  Patterns  and  Explanations,  21  ANN.  REV.  SOC.  349,  357  (1995).    
   127.     Id.  at  355.  
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B.   MINORITIES  
There   are   a   variety   of   circumstances   that  have   contributed  
to   the   general   ill   state   of   health   of  minority   groups   in   the  U.S.    
Such   circumstances   may   then   lead   them   to   take   more  
prescription   drugs   –   particularly   generics   –   thus  making   them  
more   greatly   affected   by   the   Mensing   decision.      Unequal  
treatment  of  minority  groups  within  many  spheres  of  society  has  
sometimes  led  to  further  discrimination,  and  although  efforts  are  
being  made  to  lessen  such  discrimination,  more  still  needs  to  be  
done   to   bring   their   health   up   to   an   adequate   level.      The  
prolonged   impact   of   racism   and   the   ethnic   or   racial  
discrepancies   in   the   quality   of   medical   care   are   especially  
important   factors   to   consider   when   examining   the   reasons   for  
the  poor  health  of  members  of  minority  groups.128    The  Mensing  
decision  is  likely  to  cause  further  setbacks  for  these  populations  
by  removing  one  of  the  necessary  remedial  options  of  suing  for  
damages  caused  by  use  of  generic  prescription  drugs.  
Historically,   race   and   ethnicity   have   often   been   bases   for  
different   treatment   both   socially   and   medically   in   the   U.S.    
Language   and   cultural   barriers   have   also  played   a  part,   as   has  
racism,  unfortunately.    Sometimes  this  spills  over  into  the  realm  
of  medical  care:  “[w]hen  providers  fail  to  take  social  and  cultural  
factors   into   account,   they   may   resort   to   stereotyping,   which  
affects   their  behavior  and  decision-­‐‑making.      In   the  worst   cases,  
this  may   lead   to  biased  or  discriminatory   treatment  of  patients  
based   on   their   race/ethnicity,   culture,   language   proficiency,   or  
social  status.”129  
In  general,  members  of  minority  groups  in  the  U.S.  tend  to  
be   poorer   than   members   of   the   white   majority.      While   the  
poverty   rate   for   white   Americans   stands   at   about   11   percent,  
that  number  increases  to  29  percent  for  Hispanics  and  33  percent  
 
   128.     Joseph   R.   Betancourt   et   al,   Defining   Cultural   Competence:   A   Practical  
Framework  for  Addressing  Racial/Ethnic  Disparities  in  Health  and  Health  Care,  118  PUB.  
HEALTH  REP.  293,  294  (2003).  
   129.     Id.  at  297.  
FINALCOPY.MARKEY.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   2/20/14    2:13  PM  
2013]   IMPLICATIONS  OF  PLIVA,  INC.  V.  MENSING   165  
for  African-­‐‑Americans.130    As  a  result,  members  of  these  minority  
groups  also   tend   to  have  a  much   lower   level  of  education   than  
their  Caucasian  counterparts.     This  fact   then  leads  minorities  to  
hold  lower  wage  jobs  than  the  majority  of  the  population,  which  
sometimes   include   more   dangerous   jobs   with   higher   rates   of  
occupational   hazards.131      Such   bleak   work   and   financial  
circumstances   tend   to   make   minority   groups   more  
socioeconomically  disadvantaged,  thus  leaving  them  less  able  to  
afford   prescription   drugs   that   they  may   need.     When   they   can  
afford   pharmaceuticals,   they   are   thus   more   likely   to   choose   a  
cost-­‐‑saving  generic  drug.  
Furthermore,  minorities  tend  to  be  underrepresented  when  
it  comes  to  health  insurance,  thus  leaving  them  to  pay  the  bulk,  
if  not  all,  of  their  health-­‐‑related  costs.    One  study  mentions  that  
Latinos  comprise  just  13  percent  of  the  U.S.  population,  yet  they  
account   for   25   percent   of   all   Americans   without   any   health  
insurance  at  all.132  
Research  has  shown  that  minority  ethnic  groups  in  the  U.S.  
also   suffer   disproportionately   from   certain  medical   conditions,  
including  heart  disease,  cancer,  diabetes,  and  asthma.133     For  all  
of  these  diseases  prescription  medications  are  commonplace,  yet  
minorities  are  less  able  to  afford  them  than  are  whites.    This  fact  
would   then   suggest   that   when   a   minority   person   can   afford  
prescriptions,   that   person   is  more   likely   to   take   a   generic   than  
brand-­‐‑name  because  of  the  lower  cost.  
Minority   groups   also   tend   to   have   more   health   problems  
because,   in   general,   they   tend   to   get   less   exercise,   have   less  
healthy  diets,  and  live  in  worse  environments.134    Education  and  
improved   awareness   about   food   and   nutrients   have   led   to  
improved  eating  habits  in  low-­‐‑income  families,135  but  the  cost  of  
 
   130.     David   R.   Williams   &   Chiquita   Collins,   U.S.   Socioeconomic   and   Racial  
Differences  in  Health:  Patterns  and  Explanation,  21  ANN.  REV.  SOC.  349,  363  (1995).  
   131.     See  Betancourt  et  al,  supra  note  128,  at  294.  
   132.     Id.  
   133.     Id.    
   134.     Id.  at  118.  
   135.     Helen   Afrasiabi,   Education   Helps   Low-­‐‑Income   Families   Make   Better   Health  
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healthier   foods   still   tends   to   be   prohibitive   for  many  minority  
individuals.  
All   of   these   factors   have   roots   in   minority   groups’   poor  
financial  situation  and   low  socioeconomic  status.     According   to  
Thomas   LaVeist,   Director   of   the   Center   for   Health   Disparities  
Solutions  at  Johns  Hopkins’s  Bloomberg  School  of  Public  Health,  
“When  people   are   living   in   a   similar   type   of   environment   and  
they   behave   similarly,   they   tend   to   have   similar   health  
outcomes.”136      A   different   study   conducted   by   the   U.S.  
Department   of   Housing   and   Urban   Development   (HUD)  
examined   the   relationship  between   the   types  of  neighborhoods  
where  people  lived  and  their  physical  and  mental  health.    HUD  
found  that   those  persons  who   lived   in  neighborhoods   in  which  
40   percent   or   more   residents   lived   in   poverty   improved   their  
health   significantly  when   they  were   able   to  move   out   of   those  
neighborhoods  and  into  more  affluent  ones.137  
When  lack  of  health  insurance  and  high  rates  of  disease  are  
combined,   such  as   is   the   case  with  many  minority  persons,   the  
result   inevitably   may   lead   to   an   inability   to   afford   necessary  
prescription   medications.      Because   such   minority   groups  
“currently   experiencing   poorer   health   status   are   expected   to  
grow  as  a  proportion  of  the  total  U.S.  population,”  there  will  be  
an   even   higher   percentage   of   Americans   with   less   ability   to  
afford  brand-­‐‑name  drugs,  forcing  them  to  choose  generic,  if  any  
at   all.138      Thus,   the  Mensing   decision   disproportionately   affects  
these   minority   groups,   affording   them   no   legal   recourse   for  
harmful   generic   prescription   drugs   in   the   form   of   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑
adequately-­‐‑warn  claims.  
 
Choices,  Advocates  Say,  CAL.  HEALTH  REP.    (Nov.  8,  2011),  
http://www.healthycal.org/archives/6278.    
   136.     Andrea  K.  Walker,  Where  You  Live  Can  Help  Determine  Your  Health,  Studies  
Say,  THE  BALTIMORE  SUN  (Nov.  18,  2011),  http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-­‐‑11-­‐‑
18/health/bs-­‐‑hs-­‐‑health-­‐‑neighborhood-­‐‑disparities-­‐‑20111114_1_health-­‐‑outcomes-­‐‑
health-­‐‑status-­‐‑health-­‐‑disparities-­‐‑solutions.  
   137.     Id.    
   138.     Betancourt  et  al,  supra  note  128,  at  299.  
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C.   THE  ELDERLY  
When   a   person   ages,   health   problems   certainly   arise  more  
frequently,   and   the   older   one   gets,   the   likelihood   of   needing  
prescription  drugs  for  health  reasons  skyrockets.     Although  the  
elderly   represent   just   12   percent   of   the   U.S.   population,   they  
comprise   30   percent   of   all   prescription   medication   users.139    
Additionally,   about   86   percent   of   senior   citizens   take  
prescription   drugs   every   year,   and   spend   on   average   about  
$1,000  per  person  for  such  drugs.140  
Furthermore,   the   elderly   are   a   group   that   overwhelmingly  
uses  prescription  drugs  particularly   to   treat   chronic   illnesses.141    
Such   illnesses   often   require   a   lifetime   of   treatment.142    
Additionally,   the   top   four   categories   of   drugs   that   the   elderly  
consume   are   those   that   are   frequently   identified   with   health  
issues   that   arise   later   in   life:   cardiac   drugs   (for   coronary   heart  
disease),   cardiovascular   drugs   (to   reduce   blood   pressure),  
diuretics  (to  treat  heart  failure),  and  psychotherapeutic  drugs  (to  
treat  dementia).143  
The   elderly’s   high   rate   of   consumption   of   prescription  
drugs   likely   means   that   they   will   be   more   disproportionately  
affected  by  pharmaceutical  drugs  that  harm.    With  statistics  like  
those  above,   it   is  only  natural   that   the  elderly   therefore  will  be  
more   greatly   affected   by   the  Mensing   decision.      Consequently,  
the   fact   that   about   a   third   of   seniors   on  Medicare   do   not   have  
prescription   drug   coverage144   allows   one   to   infer   that   those  
seniors   will   more   likely   use   generic   rather   than   brand-­‐‑name  
pharmaceuticals  to  reduce  cost.  
Critics  might  say  that  those  seniors  who  take  generic  drugs  
 
   139.     Gerda  G.  Fillenbaum  et  al,  Prescription  and  Nonprescription  Drug  Use  among  
Black   and   White   Community-­‐‑Residing   Elderly,   83   AM.   J.   PUB.   HEALTH,   1577,   1577  
(1993).  
   140.     Mark  McClellan,  Medicare  Reform:  Fundamental  Problems,   Incremental   Steps,  
14  J.  ECON.  PERSP.,  21,  34  (2000).  
   141.     Id.  
   142.     Id.  
   143.     Id.  
   144.     See  id.  at  35.  
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do   not   have   the   money   or   resources   to   sue   generic  
manufacturers   anyway.      Those   critics   would   be   mistaken  
though,   because   “lack   of   drug   insurance   in   Medicare   is   not  
strongly  correlated  with  income  .  .  .  More  than  half  of  uninsured  
beneficiaries  have  incomes  above  1.5  times  the  poverty  level.”145    
Furthermore,  as  stated  previously,  90  percent  of  consumers  use  
generic   rather   than   brand-­‐‑name   prescription   drugs   when  
generics   are   available.146      This   means   that   there   are   plenty   of  
well-­‐‑to-­‐‑do   consumers  who   take  generic  drugs  who  are   capable  
of  filing  tort  suits  involving  failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn  claims.  
VI.   JURISDICTIONS  THAT  MAY  BE  BETTER  OR  WORSE  FOR  THESE  
DEMOGRAPHIC  GROUPS  
In  state  court  lawsuits,  certain  jurisdictions  tend  to  be  more  
sympathetic   to   the   plight   of   plaintiffs  when   it   comes   to   claims  
against   pharmaceutical  manufacturers,   and   others   tend   to   side  
with  the  defendants.    In  West  Virginia,  for  example,  the  learned  
intermediary   doctrine   does   not   excuse   prescription   drug  
manufacturers   from   their   duty   to   warn   consumers   of   risks   of  
their  products,147  which  is  a  very  positive  approach  for  plaintiffs  
harmed   by   pharmaceuticals.      Similarly,   New   Jersey’s   Supreme  
Court  also  has  held  that  the  role  of  the  doctor  does  not  break  the  
chain   of   causation   for   a   manufacturer’s   failure   to   adequately  
warn   the   users   of   the   drug.148      Also,   Pennsylvania   courts   have  
held  that  state  law  failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑warn  claims  involving  prescription  
drugs  are  not  preempted  by   federal   law.149      It  would  seem  that  
plaintiffs  in  these  states  would  have  a  better  chance  of  recovery  
and   compensation   when   bringing   claims   involving   generic  
drugs.  
In   Illinois,   however,   the   courts   seem   to   be   fervently  
 
   145.     Id.  
   146.     Chemerinsky,  supra  note  9,  at  54.  
   147.     See  State  ex  rel  Johnson  &  Johnson  Corp.  v.  Karl,  647  S.E.2d  899,  906,  910-­‐‑11  
(W.  Va.  2007).  
   148.     See  Perez  v.  Wyeth  Laboratories,  734  A.2d  1245,  1260  (N.J.  1999).  
   149.     Knipe  v.  SmithKline  Beecham,  583  F.Supp.2d  553,  581,  591  (E.D.  Pa.  2008).  
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opposed  to  holding  drug  manufacturers  directly  accountable  for  
harm   their  pharmaceuticals   cause.     One   such   Illinois   case  dealt  
with   injuries   caused   by   the   Yaz/Yasmin   brand   of   birth   control  
pill,  which  is  one  of  the  most  recent  types  of  oral  contraceptives  
known   to  produce  dangerous  side  effects.150      In   that   same  case,  
the   judge   held   that   the   plaintiff   had   no   viable   claims   against  
either   the   manufacturer   or   the   pharmacy   that   dispensed   the  
drug  to  her.151  
VII.  ALTERNATIVE  CAUSES  OF  ACTION  
Because   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑adequately-­‐‑warn   claims   for   generic  
prescription  drugs  have  now  been  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  
be   preempted   by   federal   law,   it   is   necessary   to   analyze   other  
possible  causes  of  action  that  could  be  used  by  a  person  harmed  
by  a  generic  drug.  
If   failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑warn  claims  fail   in   litigation  because  of  federal  
statutory   preemption,   then   one   useful   cause   of   action   still  
available   to   affected   consumers   may   be   misrepresentation.      In  
the   Supreme   Court   case   Altria   Group,   Inc.   v.   Good,   plaintiffs  
brought  misrepresentation  claims  about  “light”  cigarettes;  it  was  
this  misrepresentation  which  affirmatively   induced  plaintiffs   to  
buy  them.152     The  Court  concluded  that  these  misrepresentation  
claims   were   not   preempted   by   federal   law   and   upheld   them  
based  upon  a  general  common  law  duty  not  to  deceive.153  
Even   more   recently,   and   perhaps   more   relevantly,   the  
Alabama   Supreme   Court   ruled   in   early   2013   that   brand-­‐‑name  
pharmaceutical   companies  may   be   liable   for  misrepresentation  
of   a   drug’s   risk,   even   if   the   injured   patients   who   bring   suit  
against   them   were   treated   with   the   generic   version   of   the  
drug.154    In  Wyeth,  Inc.  v.  Weeks,  the  plaintiff  was  treated  with  the  
 
   150.     See   In   re  Yasminv.   Bayer   Corp.,   692   F.Supp.2d   1025,   1035,   1037   (S.D.   Ill.  
2010).  
   151.       Id.    
   152.     Altria  Group,  Inc.  v.  Good,  555  U.S.  70,  73-­‐‑74  (2008).  
   153.     Bograd,  supra  note  96,  at  24.  
   154.     Steven  M.  Sellers,  Plaintiff  Can  Sue  Brand-­‐‑Name  Drugmaker  for  Injury  Caused  
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drug  metoclopramide,  the  generic  version  of  Reglan,  and,  just  as  
in   the   Mensing   case,   subsequently   developed   tardive  
dyskinesia.155      Justice  Michael   Bolin   reasoned   that   brand-­‐‑name  
manufacturers   “could   reasonably   foresee   that   a   physician  
prescribing  a  brand-­‐‑name  drug   (or  a  generic  drug)   to  a  patient  
would   rely   on   the   warning   drafted   by   the   brand-­‐‑name  
manufacturer   even   if   the   patient   ultimately   consumed   the  
generic   version,”   so   they   should   thus   be   held   responsible.156    
Justice   Bolin   went   on   to   note   that   many   insurance   plans  
encourage  use   of   generic   drugs   regardless   of  whether   a  doctor  
prescribes  a  brand-­‐‑name  or  generic  drug,  and   that  brand-­‐‑name  
drug  manufacturers  should  be  held  liable  for  misrepresentations  
by  generic  manufacturers  because   the  generics  merely   replicate  
the  same  misrepresentation  of  information  drafted  by  the  brand-­‐‑
names.157      This   decision   may   give   hope   to   injured   consumers  
contemplating   lawsuits   against   drug   manufacturers.    
Furthermore,   if   misrepresentation   is   not   the   chosen   claim   of  
action,   the   Alabama   decision   could   perhaps   even   encourage  
injured  potential  plaintiffs  to  sue  brand-­‐‑name  manufacturers  on  
a  failure-­‐‑to-­‐‑warn  claim  even  if  those  same  plaintiffs  were  injured  
by  the  generic  version  of  the  drug  in  question.  
Another   cause   of   action   consumers   may   use   is   a   strict  
products   liability   design   defect   theory.158      If   a   product   is  
“dangerous   to   an   extent   beyond   that   which   would   be  
contemplated  by  the  ordinary  consumer  who  purchases  it,  with  
the   ordinary   knowledge   common   to   the   community   as   to   its  
characteristics,”   a   product   is   then   “unreasonably   dangerous”  
and   a   court   could   thereby  properly   find   a   design  defect   in   the  
product.159      Some   jurisdictions  balance   the   risk  of  harm  against  
 
by  Generic,  TRIAL,  Feb.  7,  2013  (online  update).    
   155.     Wyeth,  Inc.  v.  Weeks,  2013  WL  135753  (Ala.  Jan.  11  2013).  
   156.     Sellers,  supra  note  155.  
   157.     Id.    
   158.     Bartlett  v.  Mut.  Pharm.  Co.,  Inc.,  678  F.3d  30,  34  (1st  Cir.  2012)(deciding  that  
the  FDCA  did  not  preempt  an  injured  plaintiff’s  design  defect  claims),  overruled  by  
Mut.  Pharm.  Co.  v.  Bartlett,  133  S.  Ct.  2466  (2013).  
   159.   RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TORTS  §  402A  cmt.  I  at  352  (1965).  
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the   usefulness   of   the   product   to   determine   if   a   design   defect  
exists,  under  what  is  known  as  the  “risk-­‐‑utility”  test,  and  others  
require  showing  a  reasonable  alternative  design  that  would  have  
eliminated   the   particular   risk   to   the   plaintiff.160      Therefore,   if   a  
plaintiff   has   been   harmed   by   a   particular   drug,   he   or   she  may  
recover  damages  if  he  or  she  is  able  to  demonstrate  that  the  drug  
meets  one  of  these  three  tests  in  a  corresponding  jurisdiction.  
In   Forster   v.   R.J.   Reynolds,   the   plaintiffs   sued   a   tobacco  
company   under   a   strict   liability   claim   for   unsafe   design   of  
cigarettes.161     Because   it  was   in  a   jurisdiction  that  used  the  risk-­‐‑
utility   test,   the   Supreme   Court   of   Minnesota   used   the   test   to  
agree   with   the   plaintiffs’   claim,   subsequently   ruling   that   strict  
liability  for  the  design  defect  of  the  cigarettes  was  not  preempted  
by   federal   law.162      Forster   thus   suggests   that   strict   products  
liability   claims   for   design   defects   may   be   another   way   for  
consumers  harmed  by  generic  pharmaceutical  drugs  to  address  
their   injuries   in  court,  as   long  as  the  claim  passes  the  particular  
design  defect  test  that  its  jurisdiction  uses.  
Just   because   pharmaceutical   companies   may   be   protected  
from   suits   for   failing   to   adequately   warn   does   not   necessarily  
mean   that   they   have   fulfilled   all   their   duties   to   consumers.  
Individuals  harmed  by  prescription  drugs  should  look  for  other  
ways  to  address  their  injuries.    Dean  Chemerinsky  also  notes  the  
possibility   of   “alternative   litigation   theories.”163      Through   this  
concept,   plaintiffs   would   sue   parties   other   than   generic   drug  
manufacturers,   possibly   including   a   patient’s   own   doctors,  
pharmacists,   and   pharmacies.      This   could   prove   useful,   for  
instance,  if  it  could  be  found  that  pharmacies  dispensed  generic  
pharmaceuticals   when   they   were   in   fact   directed   to   dispense  
brand-­‐‑names.      Alternatively,   a   patient   could   sue   his   or   her  
doctor   (instead   of   the   manufacturer)   for   failure   to   inform   of  
particular  harms  created  by  prescriptions.  
 
   160.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TORTS:  PRODUCTS  LIABILITY  §  2(b)  (1998).  
   161.     Forster  v.  R.J.  Reynolds  Tobacco  Co.,  437  N.W.2d  655,  656-­‐‑57  (Minn.  1989).  
   162.     Id.  at  661.  
   163.     Chemerinsky,  supra  note  9,  at  56.    
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VIII.    HOW  LEGISLATION  CAN  HELP  
Cases   like  Mensing   involving   harms   caused   by   a   generic  
drug   are   sure   to   surface   again   despite   the   difficulties   facing  
plaintiffs.      Because   the   Supreme  Court  will   not   likely   overturn  
Mensing  any  time  soon,  the  best  solution  for  this  problem  is  for  
Congress   to   amend   the   FDCA   so   that   Mensing   would   be  
overturned.  
It   is   logical   that   prescription   drugs   that   are   the   same   in  
effectiveness   and   substance   should  be   treated   the   same  way   in  
court.      Congress   should   amend   the   FDCA   so   that   claims  
involving  generic  prescription  drugs  will   always  be   treated   the  
same  as  brand  name  drugs.    This  way,  the  Wyeth  decision  would  
apply  to  claims  involving  both  kinds  of  drugs,  the  way  it  should  
have   been   applied   in   Mensing.      The   author   of   this   paper  
recommends   that   Congress   amend   the   FDCA   with   very   clear  
and  unambiguous  language,  specifically  stating  that  these  drugs  
be   treated   exactly   the   same   in   litigation   so   that   this   kind   of  
problem  does  not  arise  again  in  the  future.  
IX.    CONCLUSION  
Critics  of   this  paper  may  argue   that  generic  manufacturers  
should  not  be  allowed  to  be  sued  because  they  do  not  participate  
in  the  creation  of   the  original  drug,  and  that,   therefore  they  are  
not   the   ones   who   are   really   responsible   for   harms   caused   by  
generics.      However,   this   argument   misses   the   point;   generic  
manufacturers   are   just   as   capable   of   discovering   harms   caused  
by   their  drugs,   such   that   they  should  still  be   liable   if   they  hide  
harmful   information   or   fail   to   disclose   it.      It   may   be   true   that  
brand-­‐‑name  manufacturers   hold  more   culpability   because   they  
first   produced   a  particular  drug,   but   they  often   eventually   exit  
the   market,   leaving   generics   as   the   consumers’   only   option.    
When   this   happens,   generic   manufacturers   must   take  
responsibility   for   being   the   sole   provider   or   one   of   just   a   few  
providers  of  a  particular  drug.    Otherwise,  it  fosters  a  climate  of  
blamelessness,   irresponsibility,   and   finger-­‐‑pointing,   helping  
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neither  consumers  nor  manufacturers.  
Even   though  PLIVA,   Inc.   v.  Mensing   has   demonstrated   the  
Court’s  ability   to  rule   illogically,  remedies  fortunately  still  exist  
to   ameliorate   the   situation.      Our   judicial   and   political   systems  
are   complementary,   and,   as   previously   noted,   our   legislatures  
may  act  to  correct  decisions  like  Mensing.     During  a  time  in  our  
nation’s   history   when   health   care   is   a   very   relevant   and  
important   topic,   Congress   should   take   notice   of   the   Mensing  
decision  and  overturn   it   for   all   our   sakes  by  passing  a  bill   that  
would   amend   the   FDCA   so   that   generic   and   brand-­‐‑name  
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